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Abstract
This paper seeks to engage the organization theory community in contemporary
debates over the role of the cxxporation in American society by building a stakeholder
theory of the t%n. We develop a set of normative premises and positivist propositions
derived from these debates, from a combination of organization and industrial relations
theories, and by using data from the Saturn Corporation. Three questions are posed for
a stakeholder theory: (1) Under what conditions is a stakeholder firm likely to emerge,
(2) what are the critical determinants of performance in a stakeholder firm, and (3)
what will determine the sustainability and diffusion of this organizational form in the
American environment? The history, design features, and dynamics of the labor-
management partnership at Saturn are used to illustrate and interpret a specific case of
employees as stakeholders. Saturn’s governance structure, work organization, and
internal processes fit the characteristics of a stakeholder firm. Employees establish
themselves as critical stakeholders by using their knowledge to improve organizational
performance. The local union likewise contributes to firm performance by organizing
workers into a dense social network that contributes to problem solving, conflict
resolution, and quality improvement. However, the legal and political environment in
which the firm operates produces considerable uncertainty over the sustainability and
diffusion of Saturn’s features in particular, and the stakeholder organizational form in
general. Additional hypotheses and research questions are proposed to continue theory
building around the more general model of the stakeholder firm. Organization theorists
are encouraged to take up the analysis of stakeholder models and thereby contribute to
the contemporary and future debates over the role the corporation in American society.

Toward a Stakeholder Theory of the Firm:
The Case of the Saturn Partnership
The purpose of the American corporation is to maximize shareholder wealth. From this
basic legal principle, flows the objective function and important features of the organization
desi~ control systems, governance stmctures, and the legal rules and norms that structure
employment relations in American firms. In recent years, however, both this conception of the
corporation and the employment relations system which it fosters have come under increasing
: as concerns are voiced over, among other things, corporate downsizing, stagnant real
wages, growing income disparities, increases in contingent work and declining union
representation (New York Times, 1996).
Some of those concerned about these issues implicitly or explicitly cast their critiques in
the language of multiple stakeholders. That is, they argue that firms are composed of multiple
interests or stakeholders each of which contributes to the firm and therefore has a legitimate claim
against its resources equivalent to the claims of shareholders (HuttoL 1995; Reich 1996).
Although the stakeholder idea has been advanced in the orgtitional theory literature for some
time (Freeman and Reed, 1983; Freemw 1984; Evan and Freemzq 1988; Donaldson and
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Presto~ 1994; E~ 1978), it has yet to be defined in a way that aUows it to be developed into a
clear thecxy with propositions suitable for empirical testing. Organization theorists and
researchers will need to bring greater conceptual clarity and precision to this concept if the field is
to heed the call to contribute to theoretical and policy debates over the basic goals of the
corporation and its role in society (Stem and BarIey, 1996; Selznic~ 1996).
Aother set of critiques of the American corporate form has come from industrial relations
researchers and policy analysts who argue that the law and institutional arrangements structuring
traditional employment relationships no longer sene the needs of either workers or firms
(Kochq Ka@ and McKersie, 1986; Commission on the Future of Worker Management
‘ations. 1‘a~a~ 6 e school of thought in this field (Kochan et. al., 1986; Kochan and
mna I sts that the trial and error struggles to adapt traditional practices have
identified Ie ftires of a transformed model of employment relations that are better suited to the
current environment and needs of the parties. The transformed model seeks to increase flexibility
in the use of human resources and worker participation and influence at all levels of the enterprise,
from the workplace to the highest levels of strategic decision-making, in return for greater
commitment and contribution of the worldorce and their representatives to improve the economic
petiormance of the enterprise. It rejects a key premise built into American labor law and
shareholder mximizkg models, namely, that strategic decisions about how to compete or
produce can be separated fkom decisions over how to distribute the gains or losses that result
from organizational activities (Cease, 1937). In this way the workforce appears to become a
stakeholder in the h. Thus, the trantiormed industrial relations model might be viewed as a
specific case of a stakeholder @ one that focuses on employees as stakeholders.
Neither the stakeholder nor the transformed industrial relations perspectives have been
developed into a complete theory of the firm. Nor do we have well documented empirical studies
that explore the dynamics of organizations that approximate the models implied by these
arguments from which such a theory might be developed inductively. This paper attempts to
begin filling this void by using data born a case study of the Saturn Corporation to develop a
theory of the firm in which employees are critical stakeholders.
Our approach is to first present a set of normative premises and positivist propositions as
starting points for building a general stakeholder theory of the firm. These are derived from
contemporary debates about the corporation in society and ilom existing organization and
industrial rl s thee-” -- *-.-” s from our observations at Saturn. Then we apply these
general pro] nst< . ase of empIoyees as stakeholders and use them to interpret _
the experiences of mar ~ement and labor in implementing Saturn’s organizational principles and
design over the first decade of its life. The final section of the paper then returns to the more
general case and proposes additional hypotheses and research ideas for deepening stakeholder
theory. As such our approach fits Weick’s (1995) description of “theorizing” i.e., building theory
by iterating between inductive and deductive methods.
Saturn is an ideal laboratory for such an analytical effort since it appears to embody more
of the features of a stakeholder firm and a transformed employment relationship than perhaps any
other large scale organization in America today. Yet, as will be developed below, these features
also make it vulnerable to critics and opponents, making it also a study in the politics of creating
and sustaining a stakeholder firm in the American environment. Thus this case also oflkrs
insights into the broader political dynamics facing workers, unions, and others seeking to change
the balance of power and the role of the corporation in the American economy and society.
The Theoretical Task
The fist task of a stakeholder theory is one of definition. What defines a stakeholder h
and how does it differ from a conventional herican style profit maximizing firm? Unfortunately,
although the term is ofien used, it is seldom (if ever) explicitly defined. For our purposes,
however, we will define a siakehokier as an individual or group with an ongoing interest in the
economic well-being of an enterprise and that contributes valued resources needed for the firm to
be successfi.d. A stabholderjh-m then is one whose purpose is to achieve the joint objectives of
parties with different inter The s?z~-Wd- ~m seeks to maximize the joint welfare or utility
of the interests involved@ t995 lutethe returns produced equitably among
these interests. However, whether it - tiievesjoint maximization or requires some tradeoff
between or among the difYerentstakeholder interests is an empirical questio~ depending on the
firm’s performance. A key distinctio~ however, born a shareholder maximizing model is that
stakeholders have a legitimate claim over the residual resources of the firm. Implicit in this
definition is the notion that not all the stakeholders seek to “maximize” the same things. Owners,
for example will want to maximize the financial return on their investment. Employees may want
to balance their short term fiancial return (in the form of wages and benefits) against their
interests in long term employment security or their interest in fair treatment and
challenging/satis&ing work experiences. For a stakeholder firm to be viable overtime, it must
demonstrate its abtity to both achieve these multiple objectives and to distribute them in ways
that maintain the canmitment of the different parties.
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A iiwther detitional clarification is required it as we do in this paper, focus on employees
as stakeholders. That is, how, if at all, is a stakeholder firm different from what is increasingly
described as a “high performance” firm (Lawler, 1986). Indeed, the two share many design
features. However, we see the key diiXerenceas follows. A stakeholder firm has a dz~erent set of
goals or objectivejiaction from a shareholder fum while a high petiorrnance firm follows means
or strategies to achieve the traditional goal of maximizing shareholder wealth that have the
additional benefit of producing positive results or mutual gains for employees. This is often
referred to as a high productivityfigh skills and wages strategy (Kochan and Ostennan 1994). -
But a high petiormance firm does not alter the basic objectives of the traditional firm.
This definition begs an importar stion: ~~ are tb- stakeholders? Oflen this term is
extended to include any group that cent $res- which the organization would ~
cease to exist (SU 1963) and thus employees, Supr ters, communities, even customers are often
included under this term. In this paper we take a more modest and limited approach and develop
a specific theory based only on employees as stakeholders and leave the development of a more
general theocy to a later date.
What questions should a stakeholder theory address? We bellieve the msot critical
question lies in explaining what would it take for stakeholder firms to emerge, peforrn effectively,
sutive and be sustained overtime, and increase in number? We believe the most critical question
lies in explaining why, if this is a desirable organizational forq don’t more of them exist in the
u.s.j ~ wh~ fouows, we bra these general questions down into the following discrete
‘a
components: .
(1) What factors lead to the emergence or formation of a stakeholder model of
organkttion?
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(2) What are the key organizational features (governance, desi~ internal processes,
etc. that a&ect the performance of a stakeholder firm?
(3) What determines the sustainability and diflision of this organizational form in the
American environment?
The Normative Undeminnimzs of the Stakeholder Model
B&ore out!ining the positive elements of a stakeholder theo~ of the @ the normative
underpinnings of this conception of the firm needs to be made explicit. The soul of a good theory
!ies in its normative foundations. Freidman (1958) embeds classical and neo-classical economics
in the values of individualism and freedom. Weber emphasized the importance of the Protestant
Ethic in the rise of capitalism (Giddens, 1976). Marx’s explanations and predictions about the
evolution of society rested on the conviction that the’ ting capitalist svstI=mhe was obseiving
would lead to greater exploitation of the working clas. therti .i, .. ,.,tive economic
-*
system in which the working class owned the means of production ,~ouldbe preferable.
Institutional theories evolved first in economics out of a conviction that the laws and research
methods of classical economics did not and should not apply to labor since labor embodies a
human
1980).
element that makes it more than just another “commodity” (Do- 1949: McNulty,
Yet despite the importance of normative assumptions and values in the social sciences,
organization theory in general, and theories of the firm in particular, have seldom examined the
normative foundations or values that influence the ihming of research problems and theorizing.2
22 The recent exchange on “what is not theory’ in ~~tive Science Ouarterly (Sutton and
Staw, 1995; Weic& 1995; DiMaggio, 1995) is an example. The values or the normative concerns
that motivate theorists and influence how they frame the questions of interest are not mentioned in
the various contributions devoted to theorizing in organization research.
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Events, however, may force organization theorists to reexamine the normative underpinnings of
their theories and to reposition organization theo~ in its larger societal context (Stem and Barley,
1996). Indee& we maybe entering another historic phase over the debate of the American
corporation equivalent to those of the populists in the 1890s that gave rise to the anti-trust
legislation or of the New Dealers in the 1930s that gave rise to legislation governing financial
markets and corporate governance as well as the rights of workers to bargain with employers over
employment conditions.
Why are debates over the role of the corporation in society once again now emerging as a
significant political and analytical issue? One reason is that the pendulum maybe swinging back
after a decade of shareholder revolts that ushered in a renewal of in’ capita’:--- ~T---- ,
1996; Bowman and UseeW 1996). The net effects of the battle over mari -~‘- , ~1 :te h
control” (Jensen, 1989) of the 1980s and early 1990s has been to sh.iflpower tc ,nareholders,
perhaps at the expense of other organizational interests. Second, there is growing recognition of
a breakdown in the implicit “social contract” between employees and employers that seemed to
alIow firms and employees to jointly prosper in the three decades that followed World War II.
That contract essentially had two key elements: worker (especially manager) loyalty was
exchanged for long term security (Hecksher, 1995) and productivity and profits were exchanged
for real wage improvement (Tlwrow, 1996). The restructuring and downsizing of large firms and
increased willingness to lay off managers and other white collar employees broke the first element
of the contract. The stagnation of real wages from 1973 to the present and the growth in
inequalky of incomes broke the second element of the contract.
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l%ir~ those who come from an industrial relations tradition are concerned about the
social and economic costs of the long term decline of the American labor movement. A deeply
held tenet of industrial relations theoV is that strong and independent institutions for worker
representation and voice are critical to a democratic society. Yet neither industrial relations
theorists nor policy makers are ind~erent to the forms worker representation and voice take in
the economy and at the workplace. Unions and other forms of voice can and do impose costs as
well as confer benefits on society and to the individuals they represent and the organizations in
which their members work. Thus, contemporary debates within the industrial relations profession
revolve around how to revive worker representation and the forms it might best take to meet the
needs of the workforce and perform its economic and democratic fimctions.
FinalIy, cument debates over the role of the corporation in society reflect a deep and
growing distrust of the public in a number of society’s institutions. Trust and respect for
corporations, unions, government, and religion have all declined consistently in the past decade
(Gallup, 1996). Relations across institutions—business-government business-labor, etc. appear
to have become more polarized (Kochan, 1995). Thus, the search for an alternative conception of
the firm should be seen as part of the broader reexamination of institutions in society that is likely
to dominate political and analytical debates for the foreseeable fiture.
Corporations, like any institutio~ must seine the interests of society. Thus, debates over
the appropriate purpose(s) of corporations ultimately comes down to the partly normative and
partly positive argument over which form (or under what conditions) better serves society’s
interests. The shareholder maximbin g model of the firm rests on the assumption that society’s
resources are allocated most efficiently through corporate forms that have one superordinate goal,
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i.e., to maximize the wealth of those who provide it with financial capital. The stakeholder model
offers a different normative assumption: society is best served by corporate forms that seek to
organize its multiple interests in ways that maximize their joint welfwe and that divide these
returns equitably among the dfierent interests. Which of these conceptions is most appropriate is
partly a political question and partly an empirical issue Debates over both these issues will,
however, be great~ influenced by the performance of organizations that attempt to embody
stakehoIder principles in their design and operations. Thus we believe the major tasks for
organization theory and research are to develop the normative and positive elements of a
stakeholder theory of the firm, collect the empirical data needed to test these propositions, and
help develop the managerial methods and skills that help stakeholder firms prosper.
Frrwrnents of a Stakeholder Theow of the Firm
Fragments of theoretical arguments for a stakeholder theory can be found in disparate
literatures ranging from organizational theo~, the economics of organizations in general and in
particular those that compare American and Japanese corporations, and industrial relations,
particularly models of transformed labor-management relationships. Taken together, these
fragments suggest several tentative answers to the questions posed above. We will present these
features in propositional form to make them easily testable in fhture work and then illustrate them
with our data and experiences at Saturn. The reader should be aware, however, that as noted
above, in reality these propositions were derived iteratively as we sought to organize and make
theoretical sense out of our obsemations of Saturn over the course of this research.
The propositions presented below are first Ihrned in a general enough way to apply to any
potential stakeholder (e.g., suppliers, retailers, communities etc.).. From these general
9
statements, we then derive specific propositions for the special case of employees. We return to
the more general case in the Discussion section of the paper.
We organize the propositions around two axis that are critical to our definition of a
stakeholder and a stakeholder b. One axis addresses the characteristics and behaviors that
determine whether.or not an individual, group, or organization fits the definition and requirements
needed to be a stakzhokikr. The second axis addresses whether what we will call the governance
structure, i.e., the organizational and institutional features that together structure the production
and distributional fimctions of the enterprise, produce and, over time, reproduce, the stakeholder
firm.
Ouestion 1: When do Stakeholder Firms Emerge?
The shareholder maximhing firm emerged in American society when finance capital was S
the critical scarce resource or asset needed to form organizations of sufficient scale to take
advantage of mass markets (Roe, 1994). For other resources to gain stakeholder status they
must also supply critical resources or assets to the enterprise. Moreover, the relationship must be
reciprocal. That is, the success of the enterprise must be critical to the value of the asset so that
its owners can legitimately claim a “property right” equivalent to the property rights of the
financial investors who pooled and invested their resources to create and sustain the enterprise.
Finally, the contest for legitimacy and iniluence is not predetermined by natural forces; it is partly
volitional and strategic in the sense that not all participants want to commit their energies and
resources to the enterprise and share in governance responsibilities and not all have the power to
assert their c&@ to stakeholder status and intluence even if they have a Iegitiite claim to such
status. Thus, leadership, strategic choice, and power also influence the emergence of Stakeholder
l
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firms. With these generic propositions in mind we can now explore the more specific conditions
under which employees might be expected to emerge as key stakeholders.
Erndovee Features
Knowledge As An Ass@. Why would we expect to see more organizational forms emerge
now and in the fb~re that embody employees as critical stakeholders? To see why this is the
case, we need to explore the role of knowledge as a strategic asset in the modern firm.
Firms rely on dtierent mixes of capital, material, technical, locational, and human assets to
achieve a sustainable competitive advantage. The modem American corporation and the
shareholder maximizing principle emerged in an era where access to large pools of finance capital
was the most important new resource to be mobilized (Berle and Means, 1932; Chandler, 1978;
Roe, 1994). More recently a variety of ahemative conceptions of the firm are evolving out of ~
models that view knowledge as a critical asset and source of competitive advantage (Drucker,
1980; Thurow, 1996; Arrow, 1996). The basic proposition in these models is that in
organizations where worker knowledge is a critical asset, human resource policies will be
designed to reduce the incentives or the ability of knowledge workers to leave and thereby take
the firm’s assets with them (Rebitzer and Taylor, 1995). One way to do so is to make employees
partners by giving them a stake in the financial petiormance of the firm and a voice in its
governance structures. In some cases this financial stake is explicit as in employee ownership
plans (ESOPS) (BIasi and Kru% 1991; Blasi, 1995). In other cases, pmicularly in professional
services such as law, health and consulting the orgtition may take the form of ptinerships
rather than public corporations. One study of law firms, for example examines the stnmtural and
incentive f=tures of pamerships in which employees can “hold up” the firm by virtue of their
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ability to leave the organization and take their clients with them. This threat leads to alternative
organizational forms and compensation rules that bind partners to the organization by putting a
high percentage of their compensation at risk but rewarding partners well for their loyalty and
contributions to the firm (Rebitzer and Taylor, 1995). This perspective suggests that as
knowledge becomes a more critical asset or source of strategic advantage, organizations will
implement various types of explicit or implicit partnership arrangements, all of which serve to
treat knowledge workers as critical stakeholders. Thus, an initial requirement for employees to
become stakeholders is that the knowledge they possess is a critical asset to the firm.
Proposition 1:
The more important employee knowledge is to the success of the fun, the more likely
emnl~’~eeswill emerge as an influential stakeholder.
Ie of SDecificHuman Caoital. Under what conditions would we expect employees ~
to ./ant or believe it appropriate to seek stakeholder rights in an organization? Blair’s (1995)
theoy of the role of human capital in firms provides some insight on this question. Blair (1995)
argues that employees share a residual risk in their employment relationship with the firm and,
therefore, should be residual ckhnants against the value created. Her argument focuses on the
specific human capital employees build up overtime in employment relationships and thus sewes
as the mirror image of the knowledge-as-an-asset proposition. She argues that the shareholder
maximizing model assumes employees are paid wages determined by competitive labor markets
while the providers of equity capital absorb the residual risks associated with their investments. If
all other parties to the organization also receive fixed payments for their contributions that are
independent of variations in firm specific performance, then mximizhg shareholder wealth is
12
equivalent to maximkhg the total wealth of the firm. But, since shareholders absorb the risk
they are entitled to control the corporation in their interests.
The argument that shareholders are the sole residual risk bearers breaks do~ however,
in organizations where employees either receive a wage premium for their specific human capital
and/or are compa,sated in part based on firm pefiormance. Where either of these conditions
hol~ employees bear residual risks similar to shareholders. In the former case, the risk lies in the
costs ofjob loss since the employees would not be able to filly replace their current wage in the
external labor market. In the latter case the risk lies in the variability of employee income that is
due to variations in firm petiommnce. Blair argues that in either case employees should be
en’ .0 a rol- !.. +4- - arnance and control of the firm. ~ both si~ations, B1~ (1995) makes
the ‘or n total wealth of the firm among all residual claimants (shareholders and ~
employees) ra+ .er than just shareholders. Moreover, we might expect that employees themselves
will want to achieve stakeholder rights and influence in settings where they are sharing residual
risks. One typically sees this interest expressed directly when employees purchase or negotiate an
ownership stake in their firm (BIasi and Kruse, 1991). However, if Blair’s arguments are correct,
a broader but more latent demand for the rights of ownership exist among employees that have
built up stocks of specific human capital in their tkms.
Proposition 2:
Employees will be motivated to create a stakeholder firm to the extent that their
mmpemation is wntingent on firm pefiormance and/or their long run economic welfare is
dependent on continued employment with the flnq i.e., when employees would experience
signifwnt economic losses if required to find employment in the external labor market.
Governance Arranzement$
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The Role of LeaderShin and Power. Strategic choice (Child, 1972), institutional
(Selznic~ 1949; Di.Maggio and Powell, 1983; DiMaggio, 1988), and resource dependency
(Pfeffer and SalanciIq 1978) perspectives on organizations all agree that leaders, i.e., those who
control the decisions over how to attract and maintain resources needed from the environment,
have some discretion over what weight to give to different environmental forces and yet are to
some extent constrained by the relative power of those forces. It is this combination of discretion
and constraints that gives rise to the notion that organizational decision-makers and leaders to
some extent enact their environments (Weiclq 1983) and, over time, shape the values or
organizational culture of the firm. This is patiicularly true of the founders and other leaders who
shape the firm in “ ‘vmative stages (Sche~ 1983). Thus, we see the initial choices as shaped by
a mixture of the 1 that i ! to different stakeholder interests and the power of the ~
difXerentstakehoiws to con. ain the choices available.
Much of the organizational behavior literature on stakeholders ascribes a great deal of
importance to the values and leadership styles of top executives. Freeman (1984) and Donaldson
and Preston (1995), for example, argue that managers must view their roles as one of balancing,
coordinating and integrating the interests of the firm’s multiple stakeholders. This role definition
however, departs horn the more widely accepted defition of management’s role as an agent of
shareholders’ interests.
Organizational researchers who have employed this perspective in empirical studies
(Kotter and Hesk~ 1993) also emphasize the leadership style of top management. They argue
that some CEOS’ vision or personal values will lead them to adopt a stakeholder perspective in
dealing with employees, shareholders, customers, etc. Regardless of the legal or organizational
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stnactures under which thq worlq these leaders see their role as one of balancing the needs of
multiple constituencies and thus shape their behavior and the policies of the firm accordingly.
Little attention is giv~ however, to why some CEOS would adopt this perspective, or what
structures or incentives determine whether or not this leadership style is supported or
institutionalized in-on-going organizational operations and through leadership successions. Thus,
while hardly a sufficient conditio~ this view suggests the following proposition:
Proposition 3:
Top executives must embody the values and leadership styles consistent with a stakeholder
perspective for this organizational form to emerge.
Industrial relations theoiy shares the view that organizations have some discretion in
choosing how to respond to o~ ‘ their - “--m-- ;, however, industrial relations models
tend to give greater weight to F relat” ~ ; the contending interests or external --
resources (Koch~ Kaz and McKersie, 1‘ 36). The industrial relations view goes roughly as
follows. Leadership is unlikely to be enough. Strong forces will resist the sharing of power and
returns with non-shareholder interests. Some independent source of power is likely to be needed
for employees to gain sufficient influence in decision-making to create a stakeholder firm. Unions
are the tradltiona.1source of independent power for workers. However, traditional unions
embedded in traditional bargaining relationships are kept at arms-length from management and do
not have access to the strategic decisions afFectingorganizational design. Instead, unions (and
workers) are, acwrding to both American law and custo~ supposed to focus only on
distributional issue% leaving strategic issues to management. Thus, for employees to have a voice
in these decisions requires a union leadership that accepts and champions the features of a
tran@ormed employment relationship (Kochq Kaw and McKersie, 1986).
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The theory of trantiormed industrial relations was derived from the problems observed in
the 1980s with the New Deal industrial re!ations system (Kochan, McKersie, and Cappelli, 1984;
Ka@ 1985; Kochzq K@ and McKersie, 1986). The essence of the New Deal model is that (1)
managers, as agents of the shareholders retain the rights to make entrepreneurial decisions fkee of
interference of workers or their union representatives, (2) workers and their unions have the right
to negotiate only over the impacts of managerial decisions on wages, hours, and working
conditions, and (3) the employment relationship on a daily basis is regulated by the terms of the
labor contract and workers achieve a voice through their union representatives or by filing a
~“evance when they believe their rights under the contract have been violated. Over time, this
system leads to increasingly detailed written qovernino the lah~r process.
The transformed model grew out of c nent. nions, and companies
improve peflormance by introducing greater nexibility, ~ .,ployee participatio~ and union-
management consultation into decision-making. A central proposition in this model is that efforts
to transform the relationship at one level of the firm depend on achieving reinforcing changes at
other levels. That is, employee participation at the workplace will only be sustained over an
extended period of time if reinforced by employment security protections or assurances, and an
effective voice for worker interests in the strategic decisions that affect the long run future of the
enterprise. ‘I%M the transformed model of industrial relations envisions a firm in which
employees eum a voice in the governance process by contributing to its economic performance
through their participation in decision-making and by increasing flexibility by giving up some of
the work rubs that protected them in the traditional New Deal model.
l
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Thus, we suggest a second feature of the governance structure or process needed for a
stakeholder fkm to emerge in the American environment:
Proposition 4:
A stalceholder design for an organization is more likely to be chosen when employees have
a union or other independent source of power whose leaders believe in taking an active
role in the $rategic management of the firm.
Question 2: What are the Critical Features needed to make a Stakeholder Firm Succeed?
A stakeholder firm is composed o~ legitimates, and gives voice to the existence of
multiple interests each of which has goals that must be satisfied. Since the activities of the
stakeholders are highly interdependent, i.e, the behavior of one affects the behavior of others,
their interests can be both shared and different, and powe: z Wi( ! across
--
groups and throughout the hierarchy, there is a high potenti Oo:t. JndkL ~wmmidt and
Koch~ 1972; Je~ 1995) and for the enhancements to performance that potentially resides in
groups or teams (Cohen and Bailey, 1996) . Thus, the critical organizational tasks for a
stakeholder firm are to (1) mobilii the stakeholders to commit their assets in ways that
contribute to performance and (2) resolve the conflicts that arise when multiple interests share
power in the governance process. These requirements have profound implications for the
psychological or social contract between the employee and the firm and for the structures and
processes that govern employment relations.
Emtiowe Features
Use of Discretionary Knowledge and EfforL For employees to be stakeholders they must
contribute to the success of the firm by using their discretionary effort (i.e., their knowledge or
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other sources of human capital) to enhance firm petiormance. This can take the form of
improving productivity and quality through continuous improvement efforts, contributing to the
innovation process by creating new products or by reducing the time required to bring new
products to the market etc. The key feature, however, is that employees remain motivated and
committed to contributing to firm performance and do not fkIl into behavior patterns described in
the classic studies of group norms (Chinoy, 1955; Roy, 1953) which produce standard or
accepted production rates that are enforced by group norms and in which “rate busters” are
penaliied. The organizational governance features obviously play a role in shaping these norms
and will be discussed below, however, collective and individual employee attitudes and behavior
also influence effort norms and behavior. oThis is why firms that seek to z A“high
commitment” norms (Walto~ 1985; Lawler, 1986) often prefer to build t . .. rgan?, . ‘..,,s,,
---
greenfleld sites in which employees can be carefidly selected, screened, ana socialiiej .O fit the
high commitment model of effoti and behavior, recognizing it is more diflicult to modifi work
and group norms once they are established in an organization’s work culture. Whether or not a
new site and carefidly selected and socialized worldorce is available or the workforce comes with
an embedded work culture or no~ employees must be willing and able to use their discretionary
knowledge and effort to contribute to enhancing firm performance in significant ways for them to
behave as stakeholders.
Proposition 5: Employees must use their discretionary knowledge and effort to contribute to firm
pdorrnance if they are to be stakeholders in the firm.
Governance Featur~
Aoki’s J Form. A ckar conception of the features of the stmture and employment
practices practices of a Japanese stakeholder firm is found in Aoki’s (1986; 1990) comparison of
Japanese and American corporations. Aoki describes the Japanese corporation (J-form) as a
coalition between shareholders and employees with managers sewing as mediating agents. The
dense network of cross-holding among shareholders (largely institutional investors such as banks,
.
insurance companies, and other companies linked together within a common group or keiretsu)
provides stability and patient capital. Shareholders receive their returns through a combination of
long term capital gains, interest on debt securities, and income horn direct sales to the firm.
Emp[oyees are rewarded with employment security, promotional oppofiunities, wages tied to
seniority and performance, and retirement benefits that reward long service. Sharehol ~nd
employees have a common interest in organizational growth and stability. Human rest. . .1 *
practices support pursuit of these shared objectives through heavy investment in on-the-job
training, employee suggestion systems and quality circles, and extensive labor-management
consultation. Human resources executives are paid salaries equivalent to other executives and
play an influential role in the top governance structures of the firm.
Information exchange and coordination play key roles in Aoki’s model of the Japanese
firm. Horizontal coordination that occurs through information exchanges substitutes for the
hierarchical control systems built into the traditional American corporation (Aoki, 1990).
Horizontal coordinationand ifiormation sharing are encouraged by organizational design fatures
that break I%omthe American legal and managerial traditions of separating those who plan and
supervise from those who execute work assignments. Among these features are job rotatio~
enterprise unions that include blue collar, white coUar, and managerial employees, extensive use of
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teams and other problem solving processes that support the sharing of knowledge needed to
improve work unit and organizational performance.
While Aoki developed his conception of the Ilrm based on a simplified prototypical
Japanese organiz40~ he suggests that it is not culturally bound to Japanese society. Rather, it
may fit those environments in which markets demand product variety, where the technology can
be Mormed by and made more productive with worker knowledge, where the market conditions
support a premium on qualhy, innovation, and rapid response to changing consumer preferences,
and where the regulatory environment supports these organizational featmes.
Thus, unlike the American organization theorists who argue top management will be the
catalyst for implementing a stakeholder perspective by shaping the organization’s culture, the
Japanese corporation’s structure, financial markets, governance arrangements, coordination .Xmli=
processe$ and human resource practices serve as complementarities (IW@romand Roberts, 1993)
that give rise to and institutionalize this conception of the firm. This view therefore suggests that,
to function effectively, organizations that treat employees as influential stakeholders will need to
have the following complements f~tures:
Propositions 6a-e:
a. Sources of capital that are patient i.e., that focus on long run returns to
shareholders, and that derive their returns in multiple ways;
b. Governance structures that provide an influential role to employee interests and
human resource considerations;
c. Coordination mechanisms that achieve high levels of vefiical and horizontal
tiormation exchange and that decentralize planning and supewisozy fimctions to
those doing the WO~
d. Human resource polici~ e.g., compensatio~ training stafling and employment
security, etc. that build loyalty and commitment to the firm.
e. Labor-management ktitutions that are enterprise based.
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The Role of Confkt and its Resolution. Conflict theo~ (Schmidt and Kocha~ 1972)
would predict stakeholder firms would experience high levels of conflict because of the increased
influence of employees that had heretofore been in a low power position and the increased
interdependence among parties in a mixed motive setting. Conflicts that in the past were
suppressed by either an imbalance of power or by iimiting interactions among these parties
through hierarchical or fictional specialization can now be more readily surfaced. These conflicts
can either be constructive in that they identifj individual concerns and organizational problems
that need to be addressed in order to maintain commitment and improve performance, or if not
resolved satisfactorily, can generate conflict traps and produce a recurring cycle of low trust and
high conflict (Fo% 1974). This implies that conflict resolution becomes a more important
organizational process in a Stakeholder firm. On the other hand, the changed ‘incentivestructures
m
of stakeholder firms, i.e., the acceptance of the legitimacy of and the shared burden of pursuing
multiple interests, might imply that mutual gains are possible if the parties are willing and able to
adopt integrative bargaining strategies and behaviors (Walton and McKersie, 1965; Walto~
McKersie, and Cutcher-Gershenfeld, 1995). In either even~ regardless of whether one predicts
greater or less potential confli~ the critical task for the organizational and industrial relations
processes in which contlicts surfkce and are managed, therefore, is to promote the effective
resolution of conflicts in ways that enhance the achievement of both separate and shared
objectives (Cutcher-Gershenfel~ 1990 ). However, ineffective cordlkt resolution that
degenerates into a low trusthigh conflict cycle or equilibrium will exact a high price on the
petiormance of a Stakeholder firm (Jem 1995). For this reaso~ we see cdlict resolution
processes as a critictd feature of the governance stnwture of a stakeholder firm. The governance
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structure must give voice and representation to employee interests in both production and
distributional decisions, but in doing so conflicts must be resolved in ways that both add value to
the firm and address critical stakeholder concerns and interests. Thus, the transformed perspective
on industrial relations continues to emphasize the value of collective representation of workers by
a union or some other institutional arrangement, however, the union or alternative institutional
arrangement must fimction in away that aids articulation and aggregation of employee interests
and conflict resolutions that add value to the enterprise.
Thus the role of a union or other collective body designed to give voice to workers as
stakeholders must change substantially in a transformed employment relationship. Under the New
Deal model, unions existed as a countervailing force whose power was derived from their ability
to withhold their members’ collective labor (Gailbrait~ 1967). If unions contributed to improved -~
productivity or efficiency it was only indirectly through their “shock effects” on management
(Slichter, Healy, and Livemas~ 1960; Freeman and Medofi 1984). That is, as unions increased
wages, benefits, and working conditions, management had to find ways to become more efficient
in order to recoup the costs of these improved benefits. While periodically unions and employers
would seek to cooperate and to improve their relationships, these episodes seldom survived over
time and were not institutionalized into the structure and process of management or the
governance of the h (Gershenfeld, 1987). Instead, unions came to be viewed as outside forces,
or third parti~ only to be brought in by workers when they deeply distrusted management.
.
The transfomwd model of industrial relations radically alters the traditional view and role
of unions, o;o~her forms of collective representation. While unions continue to be held
accountable for representing their members’ economic and other interests as employees, they are
l
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also responsible for adding value to the enterprise by facilitating employee participation and voice
throughout the difiTerentlevels of the organization. The old adage associated with traditional
industrial relations that “management manages and workers and their unions grieve is replaced by
a perspective that treats worker representatives as active participants in the management and
governance process. In return for a voice in management, union leaders are expected to accept
greater responsibility for organizational decisions. The role of union leaders thus becomes one of
both representing members’ interests in negotiations and facilitating worker involvement and
voice in decision-making on a more continuous basis. This becomes a diflicult balancing act, one
that few union leaders have been successful in carqing out over extended periods of time. Thus,
union leaders can expect to encounter significant political risks in adapting to their new roles in
holder firms.
Proposition 7a-b:
a. Collective representation of workers contributes to the effectiveness of a
stakeholder firm by surfacing and resolving contlicts and facilitating worker
involvement and voice in problem solving, decision-making and administration on
a continuous basis.
b. The form of representation adopted must achieve an effective balance between
adding value to the enterprise and representing the specific interests of the
wortiorce.
Question 3: Are Stakeholder Firms Sustainable in America?
Corporations are assumed to be going concerns. That is, they are expected to have an
indefinite life, one that goes beyond its founders or original participants. Legal rights, contracts,
and procedures govern the transfer of ownership and responsibtities assumed by new entrants to
the organization. However, firms can and do fki.1,the importance of difhrent assets change over
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time, and new leaders take up positions of influence who may not share the same values and
commitments of their predecessors. Moreover, any single enterprise is embedded in a larger
normative and institutional setting where ideology and interests compete for legitimacy and
resources, and are reitiorced by legal doctrines and requirements that have been enacted in
response to and retiorce the prevailing norms, ideologies, and distribution of power. Any change
in the Iegal status of stakeholders in the corporation will therefore likely provoke a political battle
since it will challenge the prevailing ideologies regarding property rights, governance rules and the
Iaws regulating the roles of difTerentorganizational participants. Thus, for a stakeholder
conception of the corporation to survive over time and diffise to significant numbers of
enterprises, it will need to not only demonstrate its ability to petiorm well, but also maintain the
con-’ tcessive generations of participants and leaders and manage the political battles ~
needt to change prevailing ideologies, laws, and norms. As we will see, this is particularly
problematic for employees as stakeholders because stakeholder firms cotiont not only the norms
and ideologies and power of corporations but also deeply embedded ideologies and norms
regarding the role of employees as collective interests, i.e., the role of unions in American society.
Emplovee Feature$
One frequently obsemd f=ture of employee owned iirms or partnerships is that they tend
to dissolve when the original owners or partners turnover, retire, or profit sufficiently from their
investment that they are induced to sell their “shares” and allow the firm to be transformed into
traditional ownership and governance arrangements. At a more psychological level, later
generations of new hires may lack the same high commitment and willingness to use their
discretionary tiosts to enhance firm performance as those present in the early years of the
24
organization’s life. Similarly, to the extent that stakeholder perspectives are not shared by all
who come into leadership positions in organizations, stakeholder firms are vulnerable to
leadership succession episodes. Thus, how to sustain the economic and psychological
commitment of successive generations of employees and leaders to their stakeholder roles appears
to be a serious challenge in making the stakeholder firma going concern. Indeed, this maybe
.
one of the reasons why stakeholder firms are difficult to sustain in an American environment
where labor mobility tends to be relatively high by international standards. To overcome these
tendencies there needs to be some broad recognition of the value created by the stakeholder
model and incentives for successive generations of organizational participants to maintain and/or
develop ~eattributes through socialization.
Proposii . F02 %ms to survive overtime there must be means of transferring . z
bot .-~.. #cd and economic stakeholder attributes across generations of
lead, sand employees.
Governance Features
The Political Environment of Stakeholder Firms. Stakeholder models have come and gone
at various points in American histo~. In the 1960s, for example, a debate arose over the social
responsibilities of corporations. Advocates argued that corporations should voluntarily allocate
some of the firm’s resources to address social objectives believed to be important to society. Yet
these aqyments have been severely criticized by defenders of the shareholder maximizing model,
ranging from Milton Friedman (1970) to the editors of The Economist (1996), to those in
powerful finance and economic policy making positions in business and government (Business
Week 1996). While the social responsiii argument is not pafkctly analogous to the
stakeholder conception developed here, we take away from this histoIYthe expectation that
2s
arguments for an alternative to the shareholder maximizing model are likely to encounter a hostile
response from the mainstream finance and economics profession and the dominant political
culture. & such organizations that implement a stakeholder model represent a political
intemention as well as a economic and organizational experiment.
Proposition 9:
Firms that “seekto institutionalize stakeholder principles into their operations will face
strong opposition flom traditional allies of the shareholder maximizing model in dominant
positions in business, govemmen~ medi~ and academia.
The Politics of Transformed Industrial Relations. Like the stakeholder conception of the
firm, the transformed model of industrial relations lives in a highly charged and rather hostile
political and legal em” nent. l%t the nr~’‘ailinglabor law limits it by drawing a clear line of
demarcation between lhts . ‘ ities of “employees” and “managers” as both
individuals and collective groups ~ ieiler, 1990; Gould, 1994). Second, a political stalemate
between business and labor over how to change labor law has prevailed for the last twenty years
(Mills, 1978; Koch~ 1995) making it difficuh to update the law to accommodate the worker and
union roles required for a transformed employment relationship and stakeholder firm to fimction
effectively.3 Third, there is a major debate within the labor movement over the wisdom and
3The clearest example of the stalemate is the fhilure of the Commission on the Future of Worker
Management Relations created by the Clinton Adminktration in 1993. That Commission was
asked to recommend how to modernize labor policies to allow for greater employee participation
and to Overmllw the high levels of conflict assockd with the union orgdzing and recognition
process. Members of the Commission differed over how far to go in recommending changes in the
law that would support the transformed model of industrial relations and for di.ffkremtreasons, both
orpized labor and business opposed radical changes to the traditional system. In the end, this
opposition resulted in a set of compromise recommendations (Commission on the Future of Worker
Management Relations, 1994b; Kochan, 1995). Even these, however, were too controversial for
both labor and managermt and the political stalemate continues.
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viability of the types of partnerships embodied in the transformed model. This debate is
ptiiculady strong within the United Automobile Workers (UAW) (Parker and Slaughter, 1988).
Fourt& there is strong ideological opposition within business to the features of the transformed
model that increase !abor’s voice and power in strategic and governance issues and processes
within the corporation.
Thus just as the stakeholder conception of the firm operates in a highly charged and
hostile political environment so do efforts tot- much less institutionalize, the features of the
transformed industrial relations model. Stakeholder models that embody transformed industrial
relations stn.wtures and process= therefore, can be expected to engender considerable resistance
and debate.
Proposition 10:
Organizations with transfom Mus.., relations wdl encounter considerable resistance
and debate since some of their features - dy violate prevailing labor laws and challenge
deeply held ideological positions regarding the role of unions.
Methods and Data
The data for this study come flom a long term research project with the Saturn
Corporation and UAW Local Union 1853. Since Saturn’s inception we, along with other
members of our research group, have tracked its history through discussions with the union leader
who championed the project within the international union and with his counterpart in the General
Motors Corporatio~ plant visits during the years prior to the production of the first car in 1990,
and since thq through on-site interviews, observations, surveys, and participation in meetings
and seminws with union and management officials. Our relationship with Saturn reflects the
partnership norms embedded in the organidon’s mission statement and core principles. From
2’7
the begixudn~ union and management representatives urged us to work with them as partners
rather than “study” them at a distance as outside researchers. This provided us with excellent
access and cooperation. At the same time, our relationship was and continues to be one of
researchers, not consultants to the firm or the union. We have, however, fd back results of our
work to Saturn and UAW representatives earlier than would be normal for outside social science
researchers. In several cases, our results led to changes in the partnership designed to address
problems we obsewed. The data for this study therefore consist of a mix of historical
interpretation based on intemiews with the founders of Satu~ direct participant observation and
intention in the partnership, interview and field notes, internal survey data collected by the
local union and/or the company’s organizational ( oment ------- ~.J Umey data collected =
part of our own research program. Together the c -jlle~l; * :-. ,ISthe period horn e
1990 to January, 1997.
We present our interpretations of events at Saturn as an exercise in developing a grounded
theo~ (Gkser and Strauss, 1967) of the stakeholder perspective on the firm. We did not go into
this project with a stakeholder model in mind. Instead, the idea of using a stakeholder perspective
to interpret what we observed at Saturn developed as we searched to find a way to conceptualize
and assess the dynamics of the labor-management partnership that is embodied in Saturn’s
orgtitionrd design and is evolving overtime. In tu~ the more we explored the nascent
literature on stakeholdq the more it appeared that Saturn fit many of the f=tures discussed in
this literature. Thusj we saw an opportunity to both interpret what we were obseming and
provide em&i@ data needed to fbrther develop this model of the firm.
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In what follows we will describe the history, design features, and dynamics of the Saturn
partnership in ways that both illustrate (testis too strong a term given the iterative way in which
the theory was developed) the propositions summarized above in practice and demonstrate the
diflkulties encountered in creating and sustaining this type of enterprise in the American
environment. While we present this as a single case study, wherever possible, we use variations in
practices obsemd across different individuals and organizational units and over time at Saturn to
provide a more conventional test of some of these propositions (Harris and SuttoZ 1986).
Specifically, we report the results of a network analysis designed to test whether and how one
unique f-ture of the partnership, the co-management process at the work unit level, contributes
to enterprise petiorrnance.
Results e
Saturn’s Creation: The Role of Leadership and Power
Table 1 presents a timeline of critical events in Saturn’s history to date. Saturn is a wholly
owned division of General Motors (GM) with manufacturing operations in Spring Hill, Tennessee
that produces sedans, coupes, and station wagons for the small car market primarily for sale in
North America. It currently employees approximately 9,000 workers, approximately 7,300 of
which are members of the UAW. Production began in 1990. In 1995 production was
approximately 290,000 vehicles and in 1996 production expanded to approximately 310,000
vehicles.
In 1982 GMs engineering staff conducted a study that concluded under existing
management practices and labor-management relations the company could not profitably build
small cars in North hwri% and therefore GM formed a joint alliance with Japanese and Korean
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producers to import cars for this market segment. GM estimated that overseas production of
small cars could save “$2000per vehicle over its domestic production costs. Concern over the loss
of jobs in the U.S. led AMed Warre~ the Vice President of Labor Relations at GM and Donald
Ep~ the Vice President of the UAW for the GM Department to propose formation of a joint
study team to explore whether it would be possible to design an organization and employment
.
system capable of producing a small car competitively in the U.S. with American workers under a
UAW contract. What became known as the “Committee of 99” ultimately recommended a
radically new organizational form in which work would be organized into teams, work rules
would be drastically simplified, and the union would be a partner in decision-making from the
bottom to the top of the organization (0’Toole, 1996). Saturn was also tos ~ a ]abo--+n~
for imovation that might be transferred back to GM. The preamble to Saturr - L. gin~ ~~+‘ - -
collective bargaining agreement included:
Saturn and the Union, as early as the spring of 1983, recognized the needfor a new approach to
union/management relations and the more eflective use of human resources t~assembt’y of small
cars was to be fem”ble in the United States. GMand the Vhion met and authorized the
establishment of a study center to explore the possibility of innovative approaches to staflng and
operating a manufactun”ng and assembly operation for the production of Smal! cars in the
United States.
Further, Saturn’s Mission Statement has two parts:
I. To markzt vehic!es dweiopedand manufactured in the United States that are world
leaders in quality, cost and customer sati$izction through the integration ofpeopIe, technology,
and business systems.
2. To tr@er knowledge, technolom and experience throughout General Motors.
In a 1991 intewiew, Roger Smi~ GM’s CEO during the creation and early development of
Saturn stated its goal ax
Improving the eflciency andcomptitiveness of every plant we operate... Saturn is the by
to GM’s long-term competitiveness, surviwd, and success as a domestic producer.
30
Thus, from its out- Saturn was created to address the “interestsof shareholders for a small car
that would be profitable and help the rest of GM to learn from this experience and the interests of
GM employees and the UAW to provide jobs for UAW members.
These were controversial and ns~ proposals for UAW leaders. There was considerable
opposition within the UAW Executive Board since these ideas deviated born traditional seniority,
.
compensatio~ and work organization principles and took the union into the management and
governance process in ways that traditiontdkts felt would jeopardue the union’s independence.
Clearly, without the strong personal leadership and support of Ephli~ the UAW would not have
ratified the Saturn labor agreement and gone along with the new role for the union (0’Toole,
1996).
The proposed design for Saturn provoked equally strong debate and controversy w
GM and in the broader business community. One of the most controversial features of the p
was that the company would voluntarily recognize the UAW in the new facility before any
workers were hired. This provision was later challenged by the National Right to Work
Committee, national anti-union lobbying group, on the grounds that such pre-hire agreements
violate the National Labor Relations Act. The case was eventually dismissed by the National
Labor Relations Board in 1985 shortly after President Reagan visited the new Saturn facili~ and
described the union-management agreement as the most important experiment in labor relations in
the country.
This early history is consistent with Propositions 3 and 4. Leadership was important to
creation of this stakeholder mode~ however, in this case leadership within the union was equally
important to leadership within the company. Moreover, without the presence of a strong union
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able to assert its voice in the strategic decisions that had to be made to embark on and approve
this proj~ the stakeholder design would not have been chosen. GM would have continued to
import small cars from its international partners. But, as will be noted below, the internal
opposition within both the union and company (and the larger business and labor communities)
did not go away aqd would continue to af%ct the evolution and sustainability of this enterprise.
Ormnizational Desizn and Emrdovment Practice$
The fictional equivalents of many of the structural features of the stakeholder model as
described by Aoki were built into the organizational design and employment system of Saturn.
Table 2 summarizes these features.
Worker knowledge and commitment to improvement are seen as key organizational
attributes for accomplishing Saturn’s objectives. To achieve high levels of skill development new q
Saturn members received from 350 to 700 hours of training before they were allowed to build a
car. Recognizing the need for commitment to continuous organizational learning, the union in
1991 proposed linking training to the yearly risk and reward compensation plan. Eve~ Saturn
employee’s pay is tied to an annual organization-wide goal of obtaining at least ninety-two hours
of additional training.
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Work is organized into self managed teams (called work units modules), 80 percent of the
workforce is covered by a no layoff commitment, minimal compensation is tied to the industry
average, however, additional rewards are contingent on meeting negotiated pefiormance criteria,
decision-making is based on consensus principles operating through “decision rings” at the
business unit (plant), manufkturing council (manufacturing operations), and strategic action
council (senior executive) levels, and information is to be shared openly and widely throughout
the organization. The local union is represented in each of these forums as well, @as will be
described below, in the line management structure.
The features of the organization design are quite consistent with those identified in Aoki’s
J-form firm and organizations (propositions 6a-e) and with the view that worker knowledge is a
critical organizatiomd asset (jmoposition 1). The risk-reward compensation syste~ along with ~.
the high base wages and benefits of autoworkers make employees residual risk holders at Saturn.
They would experience substantial economic losses if this organization failed. This motivates
employees to assert their interests as stakeholders in the management and governance processes at
Saturn. The next logical questio~ therefore, is whether these structural fatures, i.e., horizontal
coordination through infomnation exchange, joint governance arrangements, contingent
compensatio~ job rotatio~ strong enterprise-focused local unions, etc., have been translated into
worker behavior and organizational processes that in fact contribute to enterprise peflormance.
Interest in this question led us to focus on the co-management process in action.
The Co-Manamxn ent Proc~
Aoki’s model stresses the importance of lateral communication and “tiormation sharing as
a means for coordination and control in a stakeholder firm. At Saturq the co-management
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process, and particularly, the role that union partners play in the management process, appeared
to us to be an example of this in action. Indeed, the local union’s internal structure and
governance process created a large and dense social network of representatives located in key
decision-making positions across the work units and the three plants in the Saturn manufacturing
complex. In total, over 400 members serve as partners to a manager and/or as an elected union
.
officer at Saturn. The local union organized a large number of opportunities for these members to
interact that went well beyond the sparsely attended local union meetings typical of most local
unions in the U. S. These included such things as hi-weekly “Congresses” in which all officers and
appointed partners were expected to attend and at which a mixture of local union affairs and
issues related to the partnership and operations at Saturn were discussed, “one on one” member
surveys in which these officials interviewed local union members about problems or issues at
Satu~ social activities such as softball and bowling teams, etc. We also observed a number of
incidents in which these local union members and officers would draw on their networks to solve
problems informally without going through normal hierarchical channels. In one case during an
intemiew we were conducting with module advisors in the Panel Assembly module, a team leader
came into the office stating a team member thought the torque on his air gun was improper for
screwing down the panel under the wiper blades. Improper torque would lead to a loose panel and
possibly some rattling. The module advisor called down the line to the Car Final module and
asked his counterpart there to check the wiper panels. Upon learning that the defect had been
passed on and was likely to be present in cars ready for shipping this module advisor mobilized
several colleagues to repair all defective vehicles including those in possession of the carrier
(against company security rules) before any cars with loose panels were shipped. This rapid
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mutual adjustment between module advisors in different departments was impressive. Equally
surprising was their willingness to take risks and responsibili~ for fixing problems rather than
sending them up the chain of command for a decision. This indicated a certain level of trust, and
strong horizontal communication and coordination between co-managers. Observation of
examples like this led us to hypothesize that the co-management process was behaving like a
dense social network of lateral contacts that contributed to itiormal, on-line problem solving at
Saturn. To test whether this was the case, we carried out a network analysis of the co-
management process among the work unit module advisors, the rough equivalent of a second
level of supervision in a traditionally structured firm. The detailed results of this analysis are
presented elsewhere (Rubinstei~ 1997) and are summarized in Figure 1 and Table 3.
specifically, we tested whether the communications occurring within this network of represented
and non-represented managers were related to quality petiorrnance.
The Communications and Coordination Network
Represented and non-represented module advisors completed daily communications and
time use logs for a two week period in May, 1993 to provide the data on the frequency and
content of their communications with other module advisors and the technical and fi.mctional staff
supporting the manu&cturing process (e.g., engineai.ngjmaintainence, etc.). These data were
subjected to a network analysis that described the density of communications, the centrality of the
represented and non-represented module advisors. and the specific topics dkcussed, and then
related these communications patterns to the quality performance (levels of first time quality and
degree of improvement in first time quality) for each module.
Figu~~ 1 contains a graph of the communications network of the module advisors. It is
partitioned intcthe three business units (plants) with Vehicle Systems (assembly) in the upper left,
Body Systems in the center, and Powertrain (engine and transmission manuticturing) in the lower
l
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right. Each plant is fimther partitioned between union and non-represented module advisors. For
purposes of comparison communications densities within each group of union and non-
represented module advisors for each business unit are reported. The numbers reported in Figure
1 indicate that during this two week period the union represented module advisors in vehicle
systems communicated regularly with 26.3°/0of the other module advisors in this business unit.
This compares to i 7.3% of the non-represented module advisors in vehicle systems who
communicated with each other over this time period. In both Vehicle Systems and Body Systems
the union module advisors have higher communication densities than do their non-represented
counterparts. Powefirain densities for both groups were the same.
These communications densities were firther broken down according to the topics
disc The “’ dity (number of links) and density measures as well as
com .tior 1 sues were then related to the quality levels and rates of
improvements L each module. These results are shown in Table 3. The modules were divided
into two groups - High Fkst Time Quality Improvement and Low First Time Quality
Improvement. As we can see from Table 3, the grouping of modules with the highest level of
quality improvement also had significantly higher levels of communications by the represented
module advisor. This was true for communications centrality (the overall level of
communications), and for group centralky (communications with other represented module
advisors within each plant). Most striking are the differences in communications frequency,
specifically on the subject of quality.
Departments were also divided into two groups based on their 1993 level of first time
qual@. As Table 3 shows, the level of communication and coordination is related to fist time
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quality performance. The overall site-wide communications centrality of the represented module
advisors is significantly higher in the High FTQ group. Similarly, the density of communications
among represented module advisors within each group (plant) was significantly higher in the High
FTQ group. Communications on quality was significantly higher for both represented and non-
represented module advisors in the High FTQ group, although the represented level of 3.46
quality communications was greater than the non-represented level of 2.21. Regression results
controlling for differences in technology and business unit confirmed the significance of the
relationship between communications density of the represented module advisors and quality
performance (Rubinstei~ 1997).
In summat=- ‘be network analysis shows that(1) union module advisors participate in a
dense communica Letwe oeers and with their management appointed
counterparts, and , .Ie nwr such communications occurs, the higher the quality performance
of their module. Thus, where the co-management process functions in this fh.shion,the union-
management partnership is adding value to the corporation in a fashion consistent with that
predicted by Aoki’s model of a stakeholder firm and proposition 7a pertaining to the role of a
union in a transformed relationship and organization.
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The Union as a Remesentative Body
Propositions 7b suggests that a union in a stakeholder firm must also continue to perform
as an effective representative of its members’ specific interests. How to balance this role with its
role as a partner in management has been a difficult challenge for the local union at Satu~ as it
has been historically for American unions engaged in other types of union-management
cooperative relationships (Gershenfeld, 1987). Some of the diilicuhy may relate to the
complicated local-national union stmctures of American unions, however, some may reflect the
inherent tension between intra-organizational relations in a democratic union engaged in mixed
motive relations with an employer (Walton and McKersie, 1965).
Aoki lists an enterprise u I as one of the complementary features of the J-organization,
American unions such as the ont :senti ‘ Saturn have several features that
diiTerentiate them from enterpris. .~cils m ?an. First, the Saturn local union is part of the
UAW international union. Traditionally, UAW contracts are negotiated company wide (i.e., a
national contract covers aUof GM’s facilities, another (ve~ similar) national contract covers Ford
workers, etc. Each plant negotiates a local supplement to the national contract covering work
rules specific to that operation. Saturn deviates from this arrangement by having its own
collective bargaining contract separate from the national agreement. However, the local union is
bound by the UAW constitution and the international negotiates with the Saturn Corporation and
assigns a representative to oversee the Saturn local. This international representative sits on the
Strategic Adviso~ Council at Saturn. The questio% therefore, does this structure allow the
UAW local at Saturn to seine as the fimctiomd equivalent of a Japanese enterprise union?
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Some fmtures of the union’s role appear to be fictionally equivalent. First, union
members’ and officers’ long term economic and job security interests are tightly tied to the
suwival, growth and profitability of Saturn. By accepting a job at Saturn UAW members
originally gave up transfer rights to other GM jobs. The vast majority, therefore, hope to
complete their careers at Saturn. The compensation system at Saturn places a minimum often
percent of union member’s pay at nslq and provides a reward-sharing component that can (and
has to date) produced bonuses when the firm meets negotiated performance targets. -The temns of
the 1992 contract renewal made the risk portion of pay contingent on completion of training and
established a reward portion based on quality, output, and profitability goals that produced
bonuses of $2,600 in 1992, $3,000 in 1993,$6 p‘O in 1994 and $10,000 in both 1995 and 1996.
Michael Bennett, the president of Satu cal w Inception through 1995
also articulated a view of the union that emboc .ile esst .;e of the enterprise union perspective,
namely, that long term security is a result of workers’ contributions to firm performance, not a
right conferred through contractual negotiations. He notes that Saturn’s model of worker
representation is based on the premise that long term employment security cannot be negotiated
independent of the economic performance of the firrq nor solely through collective bargaining
after all strategic decisions have been made by management. Rather, in his view employment
security can only be achieved over the long run by both contributing to the economic performance
of the firm and participating duectly in business planning and decision-making processes to insure
that worker interests are given appropriate consideration (Bennett 1988).
Yet the Saturn local is a part of the UAW international union and carries over many of the
traditions structural features, and political processes that have been paxt of the UAW-GM
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relationship for years. Some of these operate to limit the enterprise focus of the local union. For
example, the decision over whether to invest in a second generation product (Mod 2 in Saturn
language) (Hw 1994) has been heavily influenced by GM-UAW interests. GM’s corporate
executives and UAW national union leaders had to balance the desire of the local union at Saturn
for expansion and fi.lrther investment against the interests of other local unions competing for
.
GMs investment dollars and new job opportunities. The national union leaders took the position
that it made little sense to expand operations at Saturn given the excess capacity that existed in
other GM plants slated for closure as their product lines were retired. Eventually, the UAW
national leadership’s views prevailed.
Contract negotiations provided another forum where’ d and national practices and
norms have come into conflict over issues such as length of, )rkdr . . . ~e~ shift
premiums, absenteeism policies, the role of seniority, the elec.. .,J versu~ ‘int selection of module
advisors, and the election of union representatives to handle grievances. In each case, the debate
over whether to “allow” or “accept” the local union’s proposal to depafi born national patterns
and practices centered around whether this would erode indust~ standards the union had fought
hard to achieve and to enforce. Thus, the union at Saturn has deeper interests and roles in the
enterprise that need to be balanced against its historic principles and the shared interest in
maintaining high labor standards throughout the indus~.
The local union also experienced considerable internal political turmoil and debate over its
role in the partnership. The first president of the local was challenged by an opposition candidate
‘B
b
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(and an opposition “caucus’”) in 1993 elections. Similar opposition arose prior to the 1996
elections, leading the incumbent caucus to separate the roles of MAC advisor and president which
resulted in its retaining both positions. Suwey data and our own observations at Saturn clearly
showed a growing restiveness among rank and file members at Saturn throughout the 1992-96
time period. Our focus group interviews as well as the union’s internal member to member survey
.
data found that much of the concern reflected a feeling that while the union was doing a good job
of representing the memberships’ collective interests through the partnership, it was applying
insufficient resources to its more traditional role as a representative of individual workers with
particular concerns or grievances. As a result, the 1994 labor agreement provided for the election
of a set of union representatives who would be responsible for handling m ‘r grievances in a
fashion similar to the traditional grievance committee member role of other ,icar
(including the UAW). These data also showed that throughout this period - ..~abie m, vity of
the membership continued to support the partnership and believed it was preferable to the
traditional UAW-GM relationship, while they wanted oppofiunities for more individual
representation of their specific concerns. Thus, the union implemented this change to achieve a
better balance between its role as a management partner which enhanced collective representation,
and its ability to achieve individual representation of workers’ specific interests.
ConiXct and its Resolution
‘T’heUAW has a long history of “caucuses”, i.e., groups that organize a slate of candidates for
elected office. The “Reuthex Caucus” was in control of the national union leadership positions
from the election of Walter Reuther in 1948 to well after his death in 1970 (Lichtcmstein, 1995).
currently there is an “admhktmtl “on” caucus and a “peoples” caucus vying for control within the
local union at Saturn.
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As the above examples begin to suggest, Saturn has experienced significant
intraorganizational conflict over its history. Two features of these conflicts stand out. First, they
seldom took the form of bilateral, labor-versus-management conflicts. Instead, they often
involved multiple groups with different and shifliig coalitions reflecting both different horizontal
and vetiical interest groupings. Some, as noted above, involved differences between the local and
the national union. Some involve differences among managers and workers located in the Spring
Hill manufacturing operations versus engineers located in Troy, Michigan. Some reflected
differences across the three business units (plants) in Spring Hill. Second, neither these conflicts,
nor those that did follow more traditional labor and management interest group lines, were
resolved crisply through a single negotiated agreement or unilateral management decision
Instead, confiicts played out in a more extended set of discussions, often taking place in, ie
fomms until either a consensus emerged or a crisis forced a final decision. One example. .,s
was a 1992 incident to protest what the union and its members perceived to be a weakening of
management commitment to building and shipping high quality products. In this case the union
members wore black armbands in the plant to symbolize their mourning of the changed
management policy. Another occurred over whether to choose a GM plant as a supplier in the
face of evidence indicating an outside, non-union supplier could deliver the part with newer
technology at a more favorable price. Other sources of cofllct arose over difficulties
Encountered in resolving production problems identified by work teams that required design
changes subject to approval f?om engineers located in Michigu differences of view over how
much autonomy should be afforded the separate business units (plants), concerns over how to
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evaluate the performance of module advisors (supervisors), and issues involving the terms of
employment governing contract employees working in the cafeteria.
One fascinating conflict arose when the union leadership felt the company was moving too
slow in responding to production problems identified by rank and file workers. To document the
magnitude of these problems, the union conducted a sumey of its members and presented
management with a list of over 1,000 problems awaiting management attention. The presentation
was made at an afternoon meeting in a large bay of the assembly plant with over two hundred
workers and managers listening as workers, union representatives, and some of their management
allies summarized the list of problems for Saturn’s senior executives. As a result, a new problem-
solving initiative was put in place and more engineers from Michigan were relocated to the Spring
Hill facility to work on the accumulated list of problems.
Leadership Succession
Managing in a fashion that suppofis and sustains the type of partnership described above
requires a leadership philosophy and style that is not ofien found or rewarded within American
management. Saturn’s president from 1986 to 1995, Richard (Skip) Lefauve described his
approach to management as foUows:
We walk the line between providing inde~naknce and autonomy and having
interdependence recognized and honored In this way, management and union balance one
another, and the partnership bm”ngsto bear di~erent neeak for control. i’le union is in the
room, not talked to about the decision afterwards The process is inclusion, not consultation.
Real value comesfiom shared ownership of the decision itseiJ which aIsopr&ces better
outcomes.
By 1996 both LeFauve, the the top management leader, and Benne% the top union leader, who
developed and sustained the partnership principles through Saturn’s first decade were succeeded
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bynew leaders. We botisuccessors espouse theprinciples of thekpredecessors, astillbe
noted below, they also face conflicting pressures horn other executives within GM and the
leadership of the international UAW to finction in more traditional ways. Whether the
partnership principles sutive this succession is uncetiain at this stage in the organization’s
history.
External Relations
Propositions 9 and 10 suggest that firms designed around stakeholder principles would
experience considerable opposition and resistance ti-omboth traditional business and labor groups,
albeit for ve~ different reasons. In fact, Saturn seems to be leading a rather schizophrenic
existence in its external relations. On the one hand, its success in the marketplace and the
receptivity of consumers and the general public to the “A Different Kind of Company, a Different
Kind of Car” slogan it used in its advertising has made it vexydiflicult for critics within GM to
publicly criticize Saturn. Business Week (1992: 86) put it as follows:
Saturn’s sudden blast up the sales charts is heafiening for it troubled parent. ...As foreign
rivals continue to flood the market with new models, Saturn is meeting these head-on.
Almost ovemigh~ Saturn has become the highest quality American-made brand, with as
few defects as Hondas and Nissans. It’s stunningly successful at satis@ing the customer,
trailing only Lexus and Infiniti, according to researcher J.D. Power& Associates.
So the auto maker clearly has a winner on its hands. Now the question is: WN GM know
what to do with it?
On the other hant there is significant resistance within GM to Saturn. The same Business Week
article cited above contained the fol!owing comments on the reaction of executives within GM’s
Chevrolet unit:
Call it a case of bad sibling nvahy. While wunderkind Saturn Corp. basks in the limelight
with its hot-selliig new cars, Chevrolet has been shunted aside... .“All that money that
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went to Saturn during the past halfdozen years and the other GM divisions left Chevrolet
naked.” (says a Chevrolet dealer) (p.90).
These views also limit the transfer of learning and innovations from Saturn to other parts of GM
even though one of Saturn’s stated objectives was to seine as a laboratory for experimentation
and learning for the corporation. An anecdote illustrates this point. At a briefing of senior GM
executives on the results of the network analysis we discussed how to get others in the company
to learn from these data. Two comments illustrate the essence of the problem better than any
others. One executive said:
It’s ironic but utiortunately true that Ford has learned more from Saturn than we have in
GM.
Another said:
Is there some way you can present these data in a more generic form so that our managers
won’t know they are from Saturn? Once they know you’re talking about Satu~ they’ll
just tune you out and say, ‘they’re different.’
Resistance is equally strong within the UAW international leadership. As noted earlier,
Saturn is identified with the leadership of Donald Ephliu the UAW vice president who led the
effort to get GM to invest in this project and led the campaign to get the UAW Executive Board
to approve the controversial provisions of the initial Saturn labor agreement. Ephlin subsequently
retired from the UAW in part because of differences in philosophy with other top UAW leaders.
The current president of the UAW has been critical of Saturn and opposes adopting the Saturn
contract to other plants. This is one reason why GM decided to build the second generation
Saturn in another GM plant rather than approve the request from Spring Hill to expand and build
the new model there. The UAW international leaders argued against expanding the Spring Hill
facility and favored an alternative proposal to build vehicles under the Saturn nameplate in another
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plant that was scheduled to have excess capacity. The company and union decided on this
alternative and subsequently negotiated a local contract for this facility that embodies some of the
teamwork principles found at Saturn (and a considerable number of other UAW local agreements)
but kept the local agreement under the provisions of the national contract. The effect is to further
isolate the Saturn local union in Spring Hill and to limit the diffision of Saturn’s version of a
labor-management partnership.
Saturn’s visibility also makes it subject to plaudits and criticisms horn external sources.
For example, the Work in Anerica Institute, a national non-profit organization devoted to
promoting new models of labor-management cooperation and work innovatio~ has sponsored an
on-going stream of study tours to Saturn for national and international groups. On the other
Saturn was consciously not invited to testi~ before a national commission charged with the
tasKo~updating labor law because neither the national level labor nor the employer leaders who
were consulted on which organizations should testify wanted to showcase Saturn. It was too
controversial within both labor and business circles.
Finally, although there have not yet been serious legal challenges (apati horn the initial
challenge to the pre-hire union recognition agreement) to Saturn’s labor-management practices,
some of them clearly are inconsistent with the National Labor Relations Act. For example, the
deep involvement of workers and union officers in managerial roles is inconsistent with the
doctrine that there is to be a clear line of demarcation between bargaining unit members (workers)
and supervisors (managers). Extending voluntary recognition to the union before any employees
were hired i~~enerally illegal under labor law, even though the National Right to Work
Committee Iost’this argument in this particular case.
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These are only isolated examples of the broader reality: the Saturn pafinership is the most
controversial innovation in labor-management relations and organizational governance found in
America today. It has ardent supporters and vigorous critics. It challenges deeply ingrained
ideological principles, traditions, and legal doctrines. It therefore serves as a symbol for a
“diffkrent kind of company with all the advantages and risks attendant to such a position.
Saturn’s ultimate fate probably depends less on its objective performance than on how these
external and internal political dynamics are managed and p!ay out (Hancke and Rubinstei~ 1995).
But the lesson we draw fiorn this highly charged debate is that stakeholder firms that embody
similar features to Saturn’s that increase employee influence and involve collective representation
will evoke similar intense debates. For these organizational forms to be widely adopted and to
.hlvlve changes in both corporate and labor law and considerable shifi in power and
.Jeoiug in society.
Discussion
Saturn is an evolving organization in which employees collectively have taken on many of
the characteristics of critical stakeholders and the organization’s structure and governance process
were designed in ways necessary for a stakeholder firm to succeed. The company can only meet
the objectives of its shareholders if employees contribute their knowledge to managing and
improving the production process. Our analysis of the co-management process documents at least
one aspect of the union-management partnership that contributes to the petiormance of the
enterprise. However, the long term sumival of this type organizational form is far from certain. It
remains vulnerable to several external threats in the American environment: (1) ideological
opposition to the expanded role of the union in decision-making and organizational governance,
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and (2) a legal environment that discourages employees and their representatives from
participating in the management and governance processes of the firm.
In addition to these external threats, Saturn could eventually fail if it does not produce
sufficient financial returns to GM and/or it may lose the autonomy from the international union
and national labor contract that our analysis suggests is critical to its sumival as a stakeholder
form of organization. Continuity of support through successive CEOS and international union
pre&dents and officers is fm from guaranteed. Within Satu~ the failure to manage conflicts
effectively could also threaten the viability of the patinership by weakening employee willingness
to contribute their discretiona~ efforts to the firm.
AI° V@ our analysis focused on employees as stakeholders, Saturn’s design also
incorpori ,d det “rstakeholders as well. For example, the company’s marketing
strategy, . . .~red m s advertising slog~ “A Different Kind of Company, a DiiTerent Kind of
Car,” places tremendous emphasis on achieving and maintaining high levels of customer
satisfaction and loyalty. Thus Saturn carries over the same partnership principles that govern
employee relations into the relationships with its retailers. The trust and commitment embedded
in the retailer-producer partnership is essential for retailers to make another key put of the
company’s marketing strategy worlq that is its fixed price, “no haggle” sales practice. To avoid
the temptation of an individual dealer to defect from this strategy requires overcoming a classic
prisoner’s dilemma bargaining problem that can only be resolved and sustained by structuring the
incentives and the culture of the relationship in ways that allow both the manufacturer and the
retailers to prosper. Similarly, Saturn has moved toward single source suppliers linked to the
company with long term contracts and thus suppliers become a more critical resource to the
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company than in the more traditional settings where the company purchases parts from multiple
competing vendors. Thus, the stakeholder principles and propositions developed here appear to
apply these relationships as well.
Analysis of the fill range of stakeholders embedded in this organization lies well beyond
the scope of our research. Yet by focusing on employees as stakeholders in this case we have
.
derived a number of generic propositions for a stakeholder model of the firm that might apply to
other stakeholders as well. We encourage their examination and testing by other organizational
researchers.
It is not clear to us that Saturn or other organizations that attempt to adopt this
organizational form can - +ve in the present environment. Yet, regardless of Saturn’s fbture,
we expect to see increa Jmbe ltions adopt some or all of the features seen here
as human capital and m .lon-hr lcial assets rise in importance in organizations and begin to
challenge the supremacy of finance capital in shaping organizational strategies, designs, and
governance arrangements. If this is true, organizational theorists and practitioners will face a tall
order in rethinking basic concepts and practices and engaging the debates that lie ahead. Yet if
the social critiques of the American corporation and employment relationship outlined at the start
of this paper are valid, this tall order needs to be addressed both by the analytical research
community and by the policy makers and organizational leaders who will shape Iiture
organizations. We hope this paper sparks debate within the organizational theory research
community over these issues so that if and when the policy and organization! debates begin in
earnest, we will have something substantive to contribute.
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Table 1
1982:
1983:
1985:
1986:
1987:
1988:
1989:
1990:
1991:
1992:
1993:
1994:
1995:
1996:
Partnership Evolution and Deve]oDment
GM Small Car Study
Joint GMKJAW “Committee of 99” Study World Class Manufacturing
Memorandum of Agreement on Saturn Corporation
Joint Supplier Selection Begins
Fti UAW.Hiring
Approval of Initial $1.9 BNion Saturn Capitalization by GM Board of Directors
Addition of Jointly Selected UAW Module Advisors as Partners
Addition of Jointly Selected UAW Crew Coordinators and Staff Partners
First Car off the Line
Fwst Local Union General Election
Second Crew Added
First Member-to-Member Survey
Agreement Renewal Process
Withdrawal of UAW International Representative From SAC
First Election of Team Leaders (Work Unit Counselors)
Second Member-to-Member Suwey
Local Refmendum on Partnership
Second Local Union Election
Third Member-to-Member Suxvey
Saturn Integrated into GMs Small Car Group
Skip LeFauve Promoted to Head Small Car Group
Agreement Renewal Process Results in Establishment of 14 Elected Crew Coordinators
Election of 14 Crew Coordiitors with Authorization to File Grievances
Don Hudler, former VP Marketing replacesLeFauve as Saturn President
.
Mike Besmett Resigns as Local Union Presidenk Retaining Position as MAC Advisor
Joe Rypkowski Su-tis Bennq becoming the 2~ of Pr~ldent of UAW Local 1853
Bennett and Rypkowski both Wm in Third Local Union Election
GM Announces Saturn Expansion to Wilmington Assembly Plant
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~l Treat people as a fixed asset. Provide opportunities for them to maximize their
contributions and vaIue to the organization. Provide extensive training and skill development to all
employees.
l The Saturn organization will be based on groups which will attempt to identi~ and work
collaboratively toward common goals.
l Saturn WiIloopenlyshare all information inchding financial data.
l Decision making will be based on consensus through a series of formal joint labor-
management committees, or Decision Rings. As a stakeholder in the operation of Saturn the
UAW will participate in business decisions as a Ml Partner including site selection and
construction process and product desi~ choice of technologies, supplier selection make-buy
decisions, retail dealer sekctio~ pricing, business planning, training, business systems
development, budgeting, quality systems, productivity improvement, job desi~ new product
development, remitment and hiring maintenance, and engineering.
8 Self-managed teams or Work Units will be the basic building blocks of the organization.
l Decision making authority will be located at the level of the organization where the
necessam knowledge resides, and where implementation takes place. Emphasis will be placed on
nit.
:re will be a minimum ofjob classifications.
._. Jm will have a iointlv develomd and administered recruitment and selection Process,
. . . .
‘~nd work units will participate in hiring their own team members. Seniority will not be the basis
for selectioz and the primary recmiting pool will consist of active and laid off GMAJAW
employees.
l The technical and social work organization will be integrated.
l There will be fewer fhll time elected UAW Officials and fewer Labor Relations personnel
responsible for contract administration.
l Saturn’s reward system will be designed to encourage everyone’s efforts toward the
common goals of quality, co% timing and value to the customer.
Source: Saturn’s 1985 Collective Bargaining Agreement
.
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Table 3
Conununications and Quality Improvement
High Quality Improvement Low Quality Improvement T-statistic
Oremall Centrality
Rep Advisor
Non-Rep Advisor
.
Group Centrality
Rep Advisor
Non-Rep Advisor
Quality consmunioations
Rep Ad;isor
Non-Rep Advisor
c J1 Ct traliq
Rep Advisr
Non-Rep Advisor
Group Centrality
Rep Advisor
Non-Rep Advisor
Group Density
Rep Advisor
Non-Rep Advisor
21.5 15.8 2.117**
(8.13) (6.19)
19.2 17.9 0.508
(5.13) (4.99)
8.7 5.4 2.751**
(4.02) (2.11)
4.4 4.1 0.478
(1.45) (1.7)
4.1 1.7 2.789**
(2.08) (1.41)
1.5 1.9 0.844
(1.32) (1.11)
Communications and First Time Quality
High ~Q Low FTQ T-statistic
18.62
(6.98)
14.47
(6.04)
7.438
(3.86)
4.647
(1.41)
0.102
(0.036)
0.091
11.43 2.897***
(5.4)
15 0.232
(5.79)
6.125 1.09
(2.87)
3.727 1.505
(1.67)
0.059 4.006**+
(0.024)
0.104 1.025
(0.031) (0.033)
Quality Coamunioatiolm
Rep Advisor 3.46 1.76 2.170**
(2.15) (1.44)
Non-Rep Advisor 2.21 1.12 2.603’*
(1.13) (1.05)
N
32
32
31
N
32
32
32
31
* significant at the .10 level (standard deviations in parentheses)
l * significant at the .05 level
l ** significant at the .01 level
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Figure 1. Communications Density Among Module Ad~ors
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